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COMMENT
EVIDENCE-HEARSAY AND CONFRONTATION-THE ADMISSION As
SUBSTANTIVE EVIDENCE OF A PRIOR STATEMENT MADE BY A WITNESS
WHO AT TRIAL HAS No RECOLLECTION EITHER OF MAKING THE
STATEMENT, OR OF THE EVENTS IT DESCRIBES, NEITHER VIOLATES THE
GENERAL LAW OF EVIDENCE NOR DENIS DEFENDANTS' CONSTITU-
TIONAL RIGHT TO CONFRONTATION. United States v. Payne, 492
F.2d 449 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 876 (1974).
In United States v. Payne,' three brothers found guilty of
conspiracy to utter forged Federal Reserve notes' appealed their
convictions on the ground that the district court erroneously and
unconstitutionally admitted into evidence an unsigned statement
of a fourth brother, Burrell Payne. The statement, which impli-
cated the Payne brothers, was made to a Secret Service agent who
testified at trial that he interrogated Burrell and transcribed the
statement until Burrell complained of dizziness, headache and
loss of memory.' Called by the government to testify at his broth-
ers' trial, Burrell, who pleaded guilty at a separate arraignment,4
1. 492 F.2d 449 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 876 (1974).
2. 18 U.S.C. § 472 (1970). Section 472 provides:
Whoever, with intent to defraud, passes, utters, publishes, or sells, or attempts
to pass, utter, publish, or sell, or with like intent brings into the United States
or keeps in possession or conceals any falsely made, forged, counterfeited, or
altered obligations or other security of the United States, shall be fined not more
than $5,000 or imprisoned not more than fifteen years, or both.
3. 492 F.2d at 450. The statement contained the notation that Burrell was advised
that he had the right to remain silent, that anything he said could be used against him,
and that the statement was made of his own free will and without promise of immunity.
The statement provided that in November of 1971, Burrell obtained from Hubert Payne
35 counterfeit $10 bills, apparently as a gift, and that he passed them with the help of a
fourth codefendant at various places in western Virginia and southern West Virginia.
Later, Burrell received additional counterfeit bills from Hubert by paying two dollars for
each $10 bill. Burrell also stated that "I believe my brothers Roland, Clifford and Chester
also had some counterfeits." The statement ended with the notation that it was incom-
plete and unsigned because "subject complains of lapses of memory and dizzy spells." The
statement was signed by the interrogating agent. Id. at 450-51.
4. Six months before his brothers' trial, Burrell pleaded guilty in his own case to the
same charge. At his arraignment, he was interrogated as to the voluntariness of his plea.
See FED. R. Cnmm. P. 11. The record of that proceeding shows that he evidenced no
difficulty in understanding the court's questions, and even his counsel affirmed that he
understood what he was doing. 492 F.2d at 452. The court then sought to determine if there
was a factual basis for the guilty plea. See FE. R. Cmm. P. 11. The Secret Service agent
testified to the interview with Burrell, and his testimony agreed with the contents of the
statement. Burrell admitted having been advised of his rights and having signed the
waiver before being questioned by the agent. The court accepted the guilty plea. 492 F.2d
at 450. 1
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claimed no recollection of pleading guilty, of talking to Secret
Service agents, or of passing counterfeit money. Burrell was
shown the statement but stated that it failed to refresh his mem-
ory concerning the events described in the statement or the inter-
view with the Secret Service agent. The trial court concluded that
Burrell was not feigning the inability to remember and subse-
quently admitted the written statement as substantive evidence.,
The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals, in a two-one decision,6 af-
firmed the convictions and held that the admission of the state-
ment made by Burrell Payne did not violate general hearsay prin-
ciples of evidence law or the confrontation clause of the sixth
amendment.7
The right of confrontation" and the hearsay rule9 both ex-
clude certain evidence unless the declarant actually testifies and
5. Id. at 456.
6. Judge Widener dissented. Id. at 455.
7. At the outset, it is pertinent to note that the majority opinion in Payne overlooks
the rule of Lutwak v. United States, 344 U.S. 604 (1953), and Krulewitch v. United States,
336 U.S. 440 (1949), that in a federal conspiracy trial, a statement made by a conspirator,
out of court and not in the course or furtherance of the conspiracy, is not admissible
against fellow conspirators. Thus, a statement made in the concealment phase is not
admissible. Apparently, Payne could have been reversed on this ground alone. In his
dissent, Judge Widener noted the majority opinion's failure to follow this rule but devoted
the bulk of his opinion to addressing the issues raised by the manner of the majority's
disposition of the case. 492 F.2d at 457, 465.
8. U.S. CONST. amend. VI states in pertinent part: "In all criminal prosecutions, the
accused shall enjoy the right. . . to be confronted with the witnesses against him. .. ."
9. In 5 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1364 (Chadbourne rev. 1974) [hereinafter cited as
WIGMORE], the author states in part:
Under the name of the hearsay rule, then, will here be understood that rule
which prohibits the use of a person's assertion, as equivalent to testimony to the
fact asserted, unless the assertor is brought to testify in court on the stand,
where he may be probed and cross-examined as to the grounds of his assertion
and of his qualifications to make it.
See also C. McCoRMIcK, EVIDENCE § 246 at 584 (2d ed. 1972) (emphasis omitted)
(hereinafter cited as MCCORMICK] in which the following definition is offered:
Hearsay evidence is testimony in court, or written evidence, of a statement
made out of court, the statement being offered as an assertion to show the truth
of the matters asserted therein, and thus resting for its value upon the credibility
of the out-of-court asserter.
The Federal Rules of Evidence [hereinafter cited as FED. R. Ev.] were approved by
Congress on January 2, 1975, to take effect 180 days later. Act of Jan. 2, 1975, Pub. L.
No. 93-595,88 Stat. 1. The Federal Rules are reported at 12A U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS
1-38 (1975). Hearsay is defined in rule 801(c): "'Hearsay' is a statement, other than one
made by the declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove
the truth of the matter asserted." Rule 802 excludes the admission of hearsay unless it
falls under a specific exception: "Hearsay is not admissible except as provided by these
rules or by other rules prescribed by the Supreme Court pursuant to statutory authority
or by an Act of Congress."
2
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is subject to cross-examination in court. Although similar, the
two principles are not identical in purpose or in application.'0 The
rule against hearsay seeks to insure the reliability of evidence by
excluding testimony when the declarant's credibility cannot be
tested. When the declarant is unavailable" for testimony, a hear-
say statement is excluded because it is not verified by oath, is not
made before a jury capable of observing the declarant's de-
meanor, and because the declarant is not subjected to cross-
examination. Since, however, a total prohibition of hearsay would
substantially reduce the quantity of evidence, numerous excep-
10. See California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 155 (1970), in which the Court stated:
While it may readily be conceded that hearsay rules and the Confrontation
Clause are generally designed to protect similar values, it is quite a different
thing to suggest that the overlap is complete and that the Confrontation Clause
is nothing more or less than a codification of the rules of hearsay and their
exceptions as they existed historically at common law. Our decisions have never
established such a congruence ....
In Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 86 (1970), the Court stated: "It seems apparent that the
Sixth Amendment's Confrontation Clause and the evidentiary hearsay rule stem from the
same roots. But this Court has never equated the two, and we decline to do so now." See
also The Supreme Court, 1969 Term, 84 HARv. L. Rv. 1, 111 (1970); MCCORMICK, supra
note 9, § 252 at 606-07.
Professor Wigmore, generally unsympathetic to claims of the individual against the
state, reduced the confrontation clause to simply a right to cross-examine the witnesses
produced by the prosecutor at trial. 5 WIGMORE, supra note 9, § 1397. For a criticism of
Wigmore's view, see Graham, The Right of Confrontation and the Hearsay Rule: Sir
Walter Raleigh Loses Another One, 8 CIM. L. BuLL. 99 (1972) [hereinafter cited as
Graham]. But see Read, The New Confrontation-Hearsay Dilemma, 45 S. CAL. L. REV.
1, 6-8 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Read], in which the author indicates that most com-
mentators agree with Wigmore that hearsay and confrontation are coextensive rules whose
purpose is to protect the value of cross-examination. He refers to F. HELLER, THE SIxTH
AMENDMENT 104-06 (1951), for a similar proposition. 45 S. CAL. L. REv. at 6 n.20.
11. The issue of availability of the declarant is treated in the Federal Rules of Evi-
dence. Rule 803 sets out 24 exceptions to the hearsay rule which do not require unavail-
ability. The Advisory Committee's Note stated that the rule
is based upon the assumption that a hearsay statement falling within one of its
exceptions possesses qualities which justify the conclusion that whether the
declarant is available or unavailable is not a relevant factor in determining
admissibility.
Rules of Evidence for United States Courts and Magistrates, 56 F.R.D. 183, 323 (1972).
The exceptions falling under rule 804, however, require the declarant to be "unavailable"
as a witness, as defined in 804(a). The Advisory Committee's Note stated that rule 804
proceeds upon a different theory: hearsay which admittedly is not equal in
quality to testimony of the declarant on the stand may nevertheless be admitted
if the declarant is unavailable and if his statement meets a specified standard.
The rule expresses preferences: testimony given on the stand in person is pre-
ferred over hearsay, and hearsay, if of the specified quality, is preferred over
complete loss of the evidence of the declarant.
56 F.R.D. at 323. Under rule 804(a)(3), Burrell was unavailable, because he "[testified]
to a lack of memory of the subject matter of his statement."
3
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tions to the hearsay rule have been created."2 For example, a
statement made as former testimony may be admissible when the
oath and cross-examination requirements are met. 3 Likewise, a
prior statement of a witness that is inconsistent with his testi-
mony at trial is sometimes admissible as substantive evidence on
the theory that the declarant is then present to attempt to recon-
cile that inconsistency to the court and jury." Past recollection
recorded, a further exception to the hearsay rule, allows admis-
sion of a prior writing that the witness can verify was true at the
time it was made, although the witness can no longer recall the
events described by the writing." The goal of the confrontation
requirement encompasses not only the substantive reliability 'of
testimony but also the procedural fairness of the trial by provid-
ing the criminal defendant with the right to examine and test the
state's evidence in court.'" Due to the working interrelationship
12. Fourteen exceptions are listed in 5 WoMORE, supra note 9, § 1426; 28 exceptions
are listed in FED. R. Ev. 803-04.
13. FED. R. Ev. 804(b)(1) gives this definition of former testimony which is not ex-
cluded by the hearsay rule:
Testimony given as a witness at another hearing of the same or a different
proceeding, or in a deposition taken in compliance with law in the course of the
same or another proceeding, if the party against whom the testimony is now
offered, or, in a civil action or proceeding, a predecessor in interest, had an
opportunity and similar motive to develop the testimony by direct, cross, or
redirect examination.
See also McCoRMICK, supra note 9, § 255 at 616.
14. See McCoRMIcx, supra note 9, § 251; FED. R. Ev. 801(d)(1)(A).
15. FED. R. Ev. 803(5) gives this definition of recorded recollection which is not
excluded by the hearsay rule:
A memorandum or record concerning a matter about which a witness once had
knowledge but now has insufficient recollection to enable him to testify fully and
accurately, shown to have been made or adopted by the witness when the matter
was fresh in his memory and to reflect that knowledge correctly. If admitted,
the memorandum or record may be read into evidence but may not itself be
received as an exhibit unless offered by an adverse party.
See also McCoRMICK, supra note 9, § 299, at 712 which states:
As the rule permitting the introduction of past recollection recorded developed,
it required that four elements must be met: (1) the witness must have firsthand
knowledge of the event, (2) the written statement must be an original memoran-
dum made at or near the time of the event and while the witness had a clear
and accurate memory of it, (3) the witness must lack a present recollection of
the event, and (4) the witness must vouch for the accuracy of the written memo-
randum.
16. The exact intent of the confrontation clause is probably undiscoverable. See
Read, supra note 10, at 6. A good discussion of the historical origins of the confrontation
clause is found in Larkin, The Right of Confrontation: What Next?, 1 TEx. TEcH L. REv.
67 (1969). Because confrontation has been historically interrelated with the hearsay rule,
however, it is not surprising to discover that the clause is also used to maximize the
4
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of the right to confrontation and the hearsay rule, an expansion
of exceptions to the hearsay rule may have the effect of denying
rights provided by the confrontation clause.
Hearsay Aspects of Payne
Reliability is a major basis for admission as an exception to
the hearsay rule, and Burrell's prior statement in Payne was not
without some indications of reliability and trustworthiness. At
the time the statement was made Burrell had been advised of his
constitutional rights and understood that what he said could be
used against him."7 Further, as a declaration against Burrell's
penal interest, the statement would probably not have been made
if untrue."8 Not knowing Burrell's relationship with his brothers,
probability that the truth will emerge. See Semerjian, The Right of Confrontation, 55
A.B.A.J. 152, 153 (1969) [hereinafter cited as Semerjian], in which the author notes that
"if the accused is not given the opportunity to bring all known relevant information to
bear on the testimony against him, this purpose cannot be effectively realized." Id. at 156.
See Jencks v. United States, 353 U.S. 657 (1957). The reliability of a conviction is
enhanced when the witness makes the accusation in the presence of the jury and is then
cross-examined by the defendant, because the testimony is more likely to be truthful. See
Comment, Federal Confrontation: A Not Very Clear Say on Hearsay, 13 U.C.L.A. L. REv.
366 (1966). The article concludes that the constitutional rights of the individual have
consistently outweighed the concern for efficient judicial administration, and additional
administrative burdens are justified to protect the criminal defendant's guarantee of
confrontation. Id. at 380. See also Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 242-43 (1895).
Society seeks this enhanced reliability in response to a natural fear of conviction and
imprisonment of the innocent. Semerjian, supra at 153. Another reason advanced for the
confrontation right is that it is believed to be a method to control prosecutorial misconduct
and resulting unfair trials. Comment, Confrontation and the Hearsay Rule, 75 YALE L.J.
1434, 1438-39 (1966).
17. 492 F.2d at 450. But see Judge Widener's dissent doubting that the statement
could be admitted as substantive evidence at Burrell's trial because on its face it did not
comply with Escobedo v. Illinois, 678 U.S. 478 (1964), or Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S.
436 (1966). 492 F.2d at 457 n.6.
18. While the concept of declaration against penal interest is only slowly gaining
approval as a determinant of admissibility, it remains a positive indicator of the truthful-
ness of the statement insofar as it recounts Burrell's activities. See McCoRMIcK, supra note
9, § 278 at 673; Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 89 (1970). FED. R. Ev. 804(b)(3), in defining
a statement against interest as excluded from the rule against hearsay, states in pertinent
part:
A statement which was at the time of its making so far contrary to the declar-
ant's pecuniary or proprietary interest, or so far tended to subject him to civil
or criminal liability. . . that a reasonable man in his position would not have
made the statement unless he believed it to be true.
See McClain v. Anderson Free Press, 232 S.C. 448, 102 S.E.2d 750 (1958). See also 79 DicK.
L. Rsv. 189 (1974), which studies the admissibility of declarations against penal interest
in light of Commonwealth v. Hackett, 225 Pa. Super. 22, 307 A.2d 334 (1973). The appel-
late court reversed, as a denial of defendant's right to due process, the exclusion as hearsay
5
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however, one could not without great difficulty predict the accu-
racy of the portions relating to them; the assumption that reason-
able men do not make statements against their own interest does
not necessarily apply to statements against the interest of oth-
ers.19 Beyond these factors, however, the "indicia of reliability"2
are less substantial. As Judge Widener noted in his dissent:
[The statement itself is unsworn to, unsigned, not in Burrell's
handwriting, and was concluded with the inscription that it was
incomplete and unsigned because Burrell complained of "lapses
of memory and dizzy spells." The statement itself . . . is sus-
pect on its face .... 21
The prime factor determinative of actual reliability should be
the condition of Burrell's memory at the time the statement was
made; however, ex post facto evaluation of such a condition
would be practically impossible. In any event, the court did not
rest its decision on these factors.
The court first referred to Burrell's statement as a past
recollection recorded. The statement, however, fails to comply
with all the elements of Dean McCormick's definition of this
hearsay exception .2 The written statement was made two months
after the events it described, but such a delay may be permissible
under the rule. Whether it was made while Burrell had an accur-
ate memory of the events is, at best, unclear since the taking of
the statement was terminated when he complained of loss of
by the trial court of an exculpatory statement from a third party. The author collects these
justifications favoring admissibility:
It has been argued that there is no reason for making a distinction between
declarations against penal interest and declarations against pecuniary interest,
that no statement is more strongly against interest than that adverse to one's
penal interest, that such a limitation is inconsistent with the broad language
originally employed in stating the reason and principle of the present exception,
and that a declaration against one's penal interest will adversely affect one's
pecuniary interest, and thus should be admissible. The opposing rationales
causing the split of authority seem to be based upon a difference of opinion as
to whether or not the threat of criminal prosecution is sufficient to preclude an
individual from making an untruthful statement against his penal interest.
Id. at 193 (footnotes omitted).
19. See Note, Preserving the Right to Confrontation - A New Approach to Hearsay
Evidence in Criminal Trials, 113 U. PA. L. REv. 741, 755 (1965) [hereinafter cited as
Preserving the Right].
20. The phrase "indicia of reliability" is from the plurality opinion in Dutton v.
Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 89 (1970).
21. 492 F.2d at 457.
22. See note 15 supra.
[Vol. 27
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memory. More significantly, however, Burrell failed to vouch for
the accuracy of the written statement; at the trial he failed to
recollect even its making, as well as the events it described. It is
imperative to the operation of the exception that the witness
adopt the statement, because its reliability is based on that verifi-
cation of its accuracy.23 Burrell's failure to authenticate the state-
ment places the statement outside the boundaries of the past
recollection recorded exception.2
The court then reasoned that a statement which does not
meet the tests for trustworthiness under the past recollection re-
corded exception may still be admissible under that exception if
it complies with the reliability requirements for other recognized
exceptions." The court developed its rationale for admitting the
23. 12A U.S. CODE CONG. & An. NEws at 63-64 gives this additional commentary on
rule 803(5) (recorded recollection exception to the hearsay rule) from the Senate Report
in the legislative history section:
Rule 803(5) as submitted by the Court permitted the reading into evidence of a
memorandum or record concerning a matter about which a witness once had
knowledge but now has insufficient recollection to enable him to testify accur-
ately and fully, "shown to have been made when the matter was fresh in his
memory and to reflect that knowledge correctly." . . .[Tihe important thing
is the accuracy of the memorandum rather than who made it.
24. Even if the statement were to qualify as past recollection recorded, it is unsettled
whether it may be admitted as substantive evidence. The court in Payne, citing California
v. Green, correctly noted that the majority position is that such evidence may not be
offered as substantive evidence but may be introduced to impeach the credibility of a
witness who changes his story at trial. It also noted that the minority view could permit
substantive use because the dangers of hearsay are reduced when the witness testifies. If
forced to choose, the court indicated that in this case, they would have been influenced
by the potential fostering of perjury because Burrell might feign the memory loss if it
would exclude the statement. The court, however, did not base its determination that the
statement was admissible on this exception and so did not make that choice. Instead it
turned to the former testimony and prior inconsistent statement exceptions to find admis-
sibility. 492 F.2d at 451-52.
25. The court's attempt to avoid mechanical application of the hearsay rule when the
rule's purpose is substantially fulfilled is not without merit. Federal Rules of Evidence
803(24) & 804(b)(6) provide that "[a] statement not specifically covered by any of the
foregoing exceptions but having comparable circumstantial guarantees of trustworthi-
ness" should not be excluded by the hearsay rule. The Advisory Committee's Note gave
this explanation:
It would, however, be presumptuous to assume that all possible desirable excep-
tions to the hearsay rule have been catalogued and to pass the hearsay rule to
oncoming generations as a closed system. Exception (24) and its companion
provision in Rule 804(b)(6) are accordingly included. They do not contemplate
an unfettered exercise of judicial discretion, but they do provide for treating new
and presently unanticipated situations which demonstrate a trustworthiness
within the spirit of the specifically stated exceptions. Within this framework,
room is left for growth and development of the law of evidence in the hearsay
area . . . .
7
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statement by applying the standards for establishing reliability
(and hence admissibility) under two other exceptions, prior in-
consistent statements and former testimony. The majority de-
clared that "prior inconsistent statements of a witness available
for cross-examination may be received as affirmative proof when
they were made at a former trial or before a grand jury. ' 2 They
then found that the unchallenged testimony of the Secret Service
agent at Burrell's arraignment, under the circumstances of the
arraignment, satisfied those reliability standards, although the
statement itself obviously did not fit the other requirements of
those exceptions." The court found that the testimony, as pre-
56 F.R.D. at 320. To carefully control that "growth and development" and to regulate the
creation of additional hearsay exceptions, Congress, in adopting the rules, added these
restrictions; and the rule now provides an exception for
[a] statement not specifically covered by any of the foregoing exceptions but
having equivalent circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness, if the court
determines that (A) the statement is offered as evidence of a material fact; (B)
the statement is more probative on the point for which it is offered than any
other evidence which the proponent can procure through reasonable efforts; and
(C) the general purposes of these rules and the interests 6f justice will best be
served by admission of the statement into evidence. However, a statement may
not be admitted under this exception unless the proponent of it makes known
to the adverse party sufficiently in advance of the trial or hearing to provide the
adverse party with a fair opportunity to prepare to meet it, his intention to offer
the statement and the particulars of it, including the name and address of the
declarant.
FEDR.Ev. 803(24) & 804(b)(5). See also Tribe, Triangulating Hearsay, 87 HARv. L. REV.
957, 973-74 (1974).
26. 492 F.2d at 451. For support, the court cited United States v. Mingoia, 424 F.2d
710 (2d Cir, 1970) and United States v. Insane, 423 F.2d 1165 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 400
U.S. 841 (1970). Neither case, however, is directly applicable to Payne, and both cases
dealt with the issue only in dicta. In Mingoia, grand jury testimony was used, not as
affirmative evidence, but to impeach a witness at trial. 424 F.2d at 713. Insana concerned
a witness who admitted his false lack of recollection was due to a desire "not to hurt
anyone." 423 F.2d at 1170. Although a feigned memory loss coupled with an admitted wish
not to harm others is a reaffirmation of the statement or at least a strong indication of its
reliability, Burrell made no such admissions, and the trial court concluded that Burrell
had suffered an actual loss of memory. 492 F.2d at 456.
27. There is disagreement whether prior statements should be admitted as substan-
tive evidence where the witness disclaims all present knowledge, because the opportunities
for testing the statement through cross-examination may be significantly diminished.
Common-law practice did not permit prior inconsistent statements to be introduced even
for impeachment unless the witness had actually given inconsistent testimony concerning
the event described in the prior statement. See California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 169 n.18
(1970). FED. R. Ev. 801(d)(1) (A) seems to limit admissibility to cases in which the witness
actually testifies at trial and makes statements contradictory to those made at an earlier
time. In adopting the Federal Rules, Congress narrowed the exception by requiring that
the statement now inconsistent must have been made earlier "under oath subject to the
penalty of perjury at a trial, hearing, or other proceeding, or in a deposition . . . ." Id.
8
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sented at the arraignment, did not qualify as testimony under
oath or subject to cross-examination. The majority's apparent
rationale was that since statements in former testimony can be
admitted because of their reliability, Burrell's statement should
also be admitted if found reliable. The reliability of former testi-
mony, however, results from the oath or cross-examination, and
neither circumstance was present in Burrell's arraignment. Bur-
rell did not testify at his arraignment, either to the making of the
statement or to its truth. At his brothers' trial he was unable to
recall the statement and thus could not verify it under oath at
that time. Burrell was not cross-examined at his arraignment,
and he could not be effectively cross-examined at the trial as to
the truth of a statement he did not remember making. There was
no jury at the arraignment, and even had there been one, Burrell
did not testify about the statement. The jury at the trial was
likewise unable to observe demeanor during testimony. Of course,
The House Report in the legislative history, 12A U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws at 76-77,
states in regard to this change:
The Rule as amended draws a distinction between types of prior inconsistent
statements . . . . The rationale for the Committee's decision is that (1) unlike
in most other situations involving unsworn or oral statements, there can be no
dispute as to whether the prior statement was made; and (2) the context of a
formal proceeding [and] an oath. . . provide firm additional assurances of the
reliability of the prior statement.
Under the new rule, Burrell's statement would clearly have not qualified as a prior incon-
sistent statement. "On the face of it, a prior statement describing an event may not be
inconsistent with testimony that the witness no longer remembers the event."
MCCORMCK, supra note 9, § 251 at 604; FED. R. Ev. 801(d)(1)(A). If the judge concludes
the witness's claim of lack of memory is untrue, the claim might act as a repudiation of
the prior statement, and thus pave the way for its admission as inconsistent. In Payne,
however, the trial court concluded Burrell honestly had no recollection. 492 F.2d at 456.
See Reutlinger, Prior Inconsistent Statements: Presently Inconsistent Doctrine, 26
HASTMGs L.J. 361 (1974), in which the author inquires:
For that matter, how does one cross-examine a witness with respect to a
statement that the witness will not even admit he made? . . . [Niot only is
the cross-examiner deprived of the opportunity to force an immediate admission
by the witness that his conclusion . . . was faulty, but he cannot obtain an
admission of errors at all from a witness who will not even agree that he stated
the premise. He cannot elicit an explanation of the inconsistency if the witness
will not or cannot concede that it exists.
Id. at 372. The author then considers a loss of recollection, the situation in Payne:
Where the witness does not presently recall even the events with which his
former statement was allegedly concerned, even some of the critics of the ortho-
dox rule [that prior out-of-court statements by present witnesses should be
excluded when offered to prove the truth of the matters stated therein, but may
be admissible if inconsistent with, and offered to impeach present testimony by
the witness] concede that cross-examination on the prior statement is futile.
Id. at 372 n.38.
9
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the Secret Service agent was under oath at both proceedings and
was cross-examined at the trial before the jury, but this cross-
examination went only to the fact of the actual making of the
statement, not to the truth of the matters asserted therein. The
court's conclusion, therefore, that the agent's testimony "impres-
sively demonstrated"" the accuracy of Burrell's statement, was
clearly specious. There was no challenge to the agent's testimony
that a statement was made, or to his transcription of it, but
without firsthand knowledge of the events it described, his testi-
mony could not bear on the truthfulness of the statement.
The majority relied solely on Burrell's failure to object to the
agent's testimony at the arraignment hearing as the indicator of
reliability:
[Tihere can be no question in our minds that Burrell's atten-
tion was directed to his statement, that he had ample opportun-
ity to disavow the fact of the interview and what was discussed,
or to assert his lack of recollection of all or any part of it, and
that his silence, in the presence of the court, amounted to tacit
admissions that the interview took place, that he remembered
it and that he acknowledged the correctness of [the agent's]
testimony of his answers.29
This justification is unconvincing since Burrell was entering a
guilty plea and could not have been expected to challenge the
testimony that enabled him to do so. The majority admitted that
Burrell was never asked specifically if he controverted the agent's
testimony, or even if he controverted the results of the interroga-
tion, and the majority also admitted that the statement itself was
not placed in evidence at the arraignment."0 In short, Burrell's
silence at his arraignment failed to guarantee the trustworthiness
of the statement, and the majority's assumption that the circum-
stances of the arraignment minimized the possibility of a false
statement was not well-grounded.3 1 Additionally, some portions
of the statement implicating his brothers were not described at
all at the arraignment, and thus, even under the rationale of the
majority, there was no "silent tacit admission" of the truthfulness
of those parts of the statement.
The reliability the majority found to support admission of
28. 492 F.2d at 451.
29. Id. at 452.
30. Id.
31. See Preserving the Right, supra note 19, at 748-49.
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this statement under the past recollection recorded exception is
ephemeral. The conclusion that "under the special facts of this
case, the reliability of the record of Burrell's past recollection was
sufficiently established"" is a clear error. The court in Payne
fashioned, sub silentio, a new standard for excepting recorded
past recollections from the hearsay rule. In the process, it disre-
garded the efficacy of the limitations on the past recollection
recorded exception and substituted another standard for ascer-
taining reliability by juxtaposing elements of three hearsay
exceptions. The danger in this new exception is that, under any
standard, Burrell's statement was deficient in reliability. Admis-
sion of the statement defies general evidentiary rules and raises
serious constitutional issues under the sixth amendment right to
confrontation.
Confrontation Aspects of Payne
The issue of the denial of the constitutional right to confron-
tation was raised by the admission of Burrell's statement when
he was unable to respond to questions about the statement on
cross-examination. The defendants argued that, although Burrell
was physically present at the trial, his claim of total lack of recol-
lection of the statement and of the events resulted in a failure of
confrontation. In finding no constitutional violation in the admis-
sion of Burrell's statement, the majority in Payne relied on the
Supreme Court opinion in California v. Green.
33
In Green, the defendant was tried for furnishing marijuana
to Melvin Porter, a 16-year-old minor. Porter was arrested for
selling marijuana to an undercover police officer and shortly
thereafter identified Green to the police as having personally de-
livered the marijuana to him. A week later at Green's preliminary
hearing, Porter again named Green as his supplier but testified
that Green had merely shown him where the drug was hidden at
Green's parents' house. At this preliminary hearing, Porter was
extensively cross-examined on his testimony by Green's attorney.
Two months later at the trial, during which Porter was again the
chief witness, he claimed that he had been heavily under the
influence of LSD at the time and was unable to remember any-
thing other than having obtained some marijuana. To refresh his
32. 492 F.2d at 452.
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memory, the prosecutor read portions of the earlier testimony;
but on cross-examination Porter indicated that, while his mem-
ory of the preliminary hearing was refreshed, his recollection of
the actual episode was still unclear. At the trial, both Porter's
preliminary hearing testimony and that of a police officer as to
Porter's original statement to the police were admitted as sub-
stantive evidence under a California evidentiary rule. Green
was convicted and appealed on the ground that the admission
of Porter's prior statements denied Green the right to confron-
tation. The conviction was reversed in the state court system,
with the state supreme court construing the sixth amendment
to require exclusion of Porter's prior statements because neither
the right to cross-examine Porter at trial about his current and
prior testimony, nor the opportunity to cross-examine him at
the preliminary hearing, satisfied the requirements of the con-
frontation clause. 4 The United States Supreme Court reversed
and upheld the conviction. In a four-one-four opinion, the Court
concluded that the admission at trial of Porter's testimony at
the preliminary hearing did not violate Green's sixth amendment
rights, but it did not reach the issue concerning the police officer's
testimony as to Porter's original statement. The Court character-
ized the issue as "whether a defendant's constitutional right
to be confronted with the witnesses against him is necessarily
inconsistent with a State's decision to change its hearsay rules
to reflect the minority view" permitting the substantive use of
a prior inconsistent statement. The Court concluded that use of
a prior statement probably would not violate the confrontation
clause when the declarant testified as a witness "as long as the
defendant is assured of full and effective cross-examination at
the time of trial." 6 The majority in Green found that the issue
of "[w]hether Porter's apparent lapse of memory so affected
Green's right to cross-examine as to make a critical difference in
the application of the Confrontation Clause"" was not ripe for
decision, because its resolution depended on the specific facts of
the case and because the Court was hesitant to proceed without
34. People v. Green, 70 Cal.2d 654, 451 P.2d 422, 75 Cal. Rptr. 782 (1969).
35. 399 U.S. at 155.
36. Id. at 159. At this point in the discussion of Green, the majority in Payne re-
marked in a footnote: "It should be noted, however, that this statement was made on the
implied factual basis that the declarant made an inconsistent statement at the trial rather
than, as here, claimed, [sic] a complete absence of recollection." 492 F.2d at 453 n.3.
37. 399 U.S. at 168.
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the California court's views of what -the record disclosed on this
issue." Justice Harlan had no such hesitancy, however, and in his
concurring opinion stated his conclusion that "the Confrontation
Clause of the Sixth Amendment reaches no farther than to re-
quire the prosecution to produce -any available witness whose
declarations it seeks to use in a criminal trial."
In Payne, the majority concluded that, under the principles
of Green, there was no denial of confrontation, because Burrell
was produced as a witness and was "available" for cross-
examination. In reaching this conclusion, the majority admitted
that "by reason of Burrell's claim of complete failure of recollec-
38. Id. at 168-70.
39. Id. at 172, 174 (Harlan, J., concurring) (emphasis in original). Justice Harlan then
explained his view:
The fact that the witness, though physically available, cannot recall either the
underlying events that are the subject of an extra-judicial statement or previous
testimony or recollect the circumstances under which the statement was given,
does not have Sixth Amendment consequence. The prosecution has no less ful-
filled its obligation simply because a witness has a lapse of memory. The wit-
ness is, in my view, available. To the extent that the witness is, in a practical
sense, unavailable for cross-examination on the relevant facts. . . I think con-
frontation is nonetheless satisfied.
Id. at 188-89.
Since the Payne majority rests its conclusion on this statement by Harlan, it is
important to recognize the position of the other members of the Court. A footnote in the
decision helps to clarify the situation:
Even among proponents of the view that prior statements should be admissible
as substantive evidence, disagreement appears to exist as to whether to apply
this rule to the case of a witness who disclaims all present knowledge of the
ultimate event. Commentators have noted that in such a case the opportunities
for testing the prior statement through cross-examination at trial may be
significantly diminished . . .[The preliminary draft of proposed rules of
evidence for lower federal courts seems to limit admissibility to the case where
the witness actually testifies concerning the substance of the event at issue
S. .. [This] position accords with the common-law practice of not permitting
prior inconsistent statements to be introduced even for impeachment purposes
until and unless the witness has actually given "inconsistent" testimony con-
cerning the substance of the event described in the prior statement.
399 U.S. at 169 n.18. The Court cites Falknor, The Hearsay Rule and Its Exceptions, 2
U.C.L.A. L. Rv. 43, 63 (1954); Comment, Substantive Use of Extrajudicial Statements
of Witnesses Under the Proposed Federal Rules of Evidence, 4 U. RicH. L. REv. 110, 119
& n.40 (1969); Preliminary Draft of Proposed Rules of Evidence for the United States
District Courts and Magistrates, rule 801(c)(2)(i), Advisory Comm. Notes at 165 (1969).
The Advisory Committee's Note for the prior inconsistent statement rule, rule
801(d)(1)(A), states: "The rule requires in each instance, as a general safeguard, that the
declarant actually testify as a witness . . . ." Since these proposed rules were submitted
to Congress by the Supreme Court itself, this is certainly an indication that the Court
thinks the better rule is to require testimony which actually is inconsistent, and that is
not the case with Burrell's statement. See note 24 supra.
13
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tion, the scope of effective cross-examination excluded inquiry
with regard to the substantive evidence of guilt on the part of
Burrell's brothers."" The majority reasoned that since total loss
of memory differed only in degree from partial loss, and since in
Green the Court permitted admission of a statement when a par-
tial loss of recollection was claimed, then even with a full loss of
memory as in Payne, the statement should also be admitted."
The majority's analogy is inaccurate, however, because the state-
ment in Green was admitted when only a partial failure of recol-
lection was claimed and when the statement was subject to a
prior full cross-examination. This is not a simple difference in
degree because Burrell's statement had no such prior verification
by cross-examination and because the loss of memory was total.
The reliance on Green is misplaced in that the facts of the two
cases are substantially different. In Green, Porter was thoroughly
cross-examined at the preliminary hearing by Green's attorney.
In Payne, Burrell did not testify at his arraignment; his testimony
at the trial consisted essentially of failing to remember anything
about the alleged crime. Burrell's statement was not made under
oath or in the presence of a jury, nor was he cross-examined by
defendants' counsel at the time it was made. The Court in Green
noted that these lost protections could be regained only by full
and effective cross-examination at the trial.4 2 In Payne, however,
no such full cross-examination was possible, as even the majority
acknowledged.43
The majority concluded its discussion of the confrontation
issue by stating:
It is true that where complete failure of recollection is claimed,
the truth of the earlier statement is not verified by an oath....
It is also true that where complete failure of recollection is
claimed the truth of the earlier statement is not tested by cross-
examination with regard to its substantive content, but
California v. Green ...indicates that we should reverse only
if we conclude that "apparent lapse of memory so affected...
[the] right to cross-examine as to make a critical difference in
40. 492 F.2d at 454.
41. Id.
42. 399 U.S. at 158.
43. 492 F.2d at 454. Another difference between the cases is that in Green, one
purpose for allowing the state rule to stand was to permit the states to promote expansion
of the rules of evidence; Payne is not a state case, but a prosecution in federal district
court for conspiracy to violate a federal statute.
[Vol. 27
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the application of the Confrontation Clause .... " [W]e can-
not reach that conclusion here.4
The majority's conclusion is incorrect because if Burrell's lapse
of memory does not so affect the right to cross-examine as to
make a critical difference in the application of the confrontation
clause, it is difficult to imagine any situation which would.
The situation in Payne is similar to that in Douglas v.
Alabama.45 In Douglas, the prosecutor read a codefendant-
witness's prior confession to him on the stand to refresh his mem-
ory. Loyd, the witness, refused to answer any questions and in-
voked the fifth amendment right against self-incrimination. Po-
lice officers then testified that Loyd had made the confession.
The Supreme Court held that the admission of the prior state-
ment resulted in a denial of Douglas's right to confrontation on
the ground that Douglas was unable to cross-examine Loyd as to
the portions of the statement incriminating him and that any
cross-examination of the officers only showed that the statement
was made, not that it was true. The Court noted that Loyd's re-
fusal to answer could have been interpreted by the jury as an
admission of the truth of the statement and concluded that effec-
tive confrontation was possible only if Loyd affirmed the state-
ment as his." As in Douglas, Burrell did not affirm the prior
statement, and the testimony of the Secret Service agent only
showed that a statement had been made. Similarly, Burrell's loss
of memory also could have been interpreted by the jury as a silent
admission that the statement was true. By analogy to Douglas,
the defendants in Payne were denied the right of confrontation.
Green and its companion case47 have rightly been criticized"
44. Id.
45. 380 U.S. 415 (1965).
46. Id. at 419-20.
47. In Green and Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74 (1970), the Supreme Court attempted
to sever the hearsay rule from the confrontation clause in an effort to give the states leeway
to broaden their evidentiary rules. Evans was a habeas corpus proceeding by Alex Evans,
who had been convicted of murder in a Georgia court. The state had presented twenty
witnesses including an eyewitness, who detailed Evans' part in the crime. The court also
admitted over objections (for denial of confrontation and hearsay) the statement of one
witness that when he asked an alleged accomplice, a fellow prisoner, how he made out in
court, the alleged accomplice had replied, "If it hadn't been for that dirty son-of-a-bitch
Alex Evans, we wouldn't be in this now." The statement was admitted under a Georgia
statute which allowed admission of a conspirator's statements against other conspirators.
The Fifth Circuit upheld the defendant's writ because the exception was broader than that
allowed in federal conspiracy trials. The Supreme Court reversed in a 4-1-4 decision. The
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for rejecting the body of confrontation case law developed by the
Warren Court by applying a due process fairness or "indicia of
reliability" 9 standard" and for failing to develop a coherent
theory of the relationship between hearsay and confrontation."
sixth amendment merely because the state rule did not coincide exactly with the federal
rule, and that the circumstances did not constitute a denial of confrontation because the
statement was not "crucial" or "deastating", and there were "indicia of reliability" to
warrant admission of the statement. Justice Harlan concurred in the result on the ground
that the application of the state statute satisfied the due process requirements for a fair
trial.
The result of the decisions in Green and Evans was to further muddle an already
confused area of the law of evidence-the issue of whether the relaxation of the hearsay
rule should be allowed to deny confrontation, or whether the lack of confrontation should
permit the exclusion of reliable and relevant evidence. See Read, supra note 10, in which
the author concludes that the view espoused in every major Supreme Court decision since
1894, that the core value protected by the confrontation clause is cross-examination, can
no longer be considered the law after Evans. In investigating whether the Court's incorpo-
ration of the confrontation clause into the fourteenth amendment in Pointer v. Texas, 380
U.S. 400 (1965), in effect constitutionalized the hearsay rule, the author surveys the
historical background of both confrontation and hearsay including previous decisional law
and reform attempts. He then dissects the Supreme Court opinions in Green and Evans,
analyzing both the decisions as a whole and the individual justices' positions. The article
concludes with six approaches to take in determining to what extent, if any, the hearsay
rule is constitutionalized by the confrontation clause.
48. See Davenport, The Confrontation Clause and The Co-Conspirator Exception In
Criminal Prosecutions: A Functional Analysis, 85 HARv. L. REv. 1378, 1381 (1972), in
which the author cautioned that "unless closely shepherded, the consequences. . could
trample the essence of the right guaranteed by the confrontation clause-the opportunity
for a criminal defendant to probe the truth of the evidence presented to show his guilt."
This fear was realized in Payne by the court's unwarranted and dangerous extension of
the Green and Evans rule.
49. Justice Marshall, in Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74 (1970), dissented because the
admission was so inherently prejudicial:
If "indicia of reliability" are so easy to come by, and prove so much, then it is
only reasonable to ask whether the Confrontation Clause has any independent
vitality at all in protecting a criminal defendant against the use of extra-judicial
statements not subject to cross-examination and not exposed to a jury assess-
ment of the declarant's demeanor at trial. I believe the Confrontation Clause
has been sunk if any out-of-court statement bearing an indicium of a probative
likelihood can come in, no matter how damaging the statement may be or how
great the need for the truth-discovering test of cross-examination.
Id. at 100, 110 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted).
50. Note, The Burger Court and The Confrontation Clause: A Return to the Fair Trial
Rule, 7 JoHN MmRsHALL J. op PRAc. & PRoc. 136 (1973):
It is clear. . .that by 1970 a majority of the Court not only had been unwilling
to carry the holdings of earlier Supreme Court confrontation cases to their
logical conclusion, but also was trying to avoid their application entirely by
substituting either an "indicia of reliability" test or a due process approach.
Id. at 153. The note deals with the present Court's apparent return to the due process
fairness approach to the confrontation clause.
51. See Younger, Confrontation and Hearsay: A Look Backward, A Peek Forward, 1
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The majority in Payne was also unable to resolve this issue and
concluded by holding that an unsubstantiated statement which
is not remembered by its maker and which is, at best, of question-
able reliability, sufficiently fulfills the requirements for an excep-
tion to the hearsay rule. Further, the statement was held to com-
port with the right to confrontation, although the declarant was
never able at any point in the proceedings to make any comment
on the circumstances of its making or the truth of its contents. It
is unfortunate that such a confused analysis should result in
criminal convictions.
52
HoFsTRA L. REv. 32 (1973), where the author states:
This is bad judicial craftmanship, for unilluminated by such a theory [of the
relationship between hearsay and confrontation] the Court decides in the dark,
heedless of consistency with the past and implications for the future.
Id. at 41.
52. See Comment, The Uncertain Relationship Between the Hearsay Rule and the
Confrontation Clause, 52 TFx. L. REV. 1167 (1974), in which the author, after a thorough
examination of the various legal theories concerning the confrontation and hearsay rules,
warned:
Unless all courts dealing with these difficult problems develop a clearer method
of analysis and better articulate their reasoning, there is a substantial risk that
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